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PLAYERS OR PLAYING CARDS?: 
THE PALESTINIANS AND THE GULF CRISIS 
Yossi Shain & Reuben Aharoni 
Tel Aviv University 
I 
Of all the national communities who have struggled for 
national independence since the Second World War the Palestini-
ans led by the Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO, attained 
an unprecedented resonance and powerful position in the interna-
tional scene; more so than any stateless contender and to a greater 
degree than many independent states. The significant role played 
by the Palestinians in contemporary world politics was acutely 
emphasized during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, when they 
emerged as a central player capable of weakening the interna-
tional coalition established by the American President George 
Bush against Saddam Hussein of Iraq. 
The question to be posed here is how did an ethnic-
national group like the Palestinians, having no country of its own 
and whose leadership is based in exile, succeed in attaining such 
a key political role in world politics; this despite the fact that the 
Palestinians have adopted a stand contrary to the broad interna-
tional consensus in one of the most serious global crises - the 
Persian Gulf. The answer to this question can be found in the 
unique position of the Palestinians vis-a-vis the Arab world; their 
ability to effect or impede Arab unity and to represent two of the 
strongest symbolic forces in mobilizing Arab masses Pan-Ara-
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bism and Islam. This position testifies not to the PLO's organiza-
tional strength or its military might but rather expresses the 
poverty of Arab regimes' legitimation formula. Indeed, the sup-
port of the Palestinian cause by Arab regimes is often more verbal 
than actual, though supporting the Palestinians is essential for the 
personal justification of these regimes. This commitment to the 
Palestinians may hinder the ability of Arab governments to act 
independently on the international scene should their interests 
collide with what is broadly perceived as the Palestinians interest. 
In this short article we will discuss the unique position 
upheld by the Palestinians in the Muslim-Arab world as well as in 
World affairs as it came to light in the months following the 
Persian Gulf crisis. In reviewing Palestinian behavior, the reac-
tion of Arab countries, and the international community it will 
become apparent how narrow is the commonly accepted thesis 
that the Palestinians are only pawns in advancing the interest of 
their Arab patrons. Dialecticaly speaking it can be stated that the 
Palestinians have turned from clients to patrons as a result of their 
unique position. 
II 
In the Spring of 1990 it seemed as if the Palestinian 
struggle for national independence in the Israeli occupied West 
Bank and Gaza was profiting on the international scene, espe-
cially in the United States. After a period of two and a half years 
of national uprising in the occupied territories, 
known as the intifada. the PLO leaders managed to create a wedge 
in the close ties between the U.S. and Israel. In May 1990 the 
tension between Washington and Jerusalem reached unprece-
dented heights when the U.S., Israel's most devoted ally, was 
preparing to support an Arab League initiative in the U .N. con-
demning Israel policies in the occupied territories "as a breach of 
International Law." 1 
The international pressure on Israel to find a solution to the 
historical conflict with the Palestinians increased substantially 
after December 1988, when the U.S. decided to commence a 
"substantive dialogue" with the PLO; a decision which brought to 
an end the long standing American objection to such contacts. 
While high riding the waves of sympathy which the intifada 
evoked through the media, PLO leader Y asser Arafat announced 
in a dramatic move that he foreswore terrorism and accepted U .N. 
resolutions 242 and 338 that recognize Israel's right as a sovereign 
state. On November 1988, at the Nineteenth Palestinian National 
Council (PNC) meeting, in Algiers, the Palestinians officially 
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declared "Independence and Palestinian Statehood." 
Toward the end of 1989 U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker initiated a peace plan, widely known as the "Baker Plan", 
calling for an Israeli-Arab confluence aimed at leading to free 
elections in the occupied territories to determine the Palestinian 
representatives for future talks with Israel. 2 The internal debate in 
Israel regarding the adoption or rejection of the Baker Plan and the 
U.S. pressure on the Israeli government to move towards a 
meeting with the Palestinians eventually led in March 15, 1990 to 
the downfall of the Unity Coalition Government ofYitzak Shamir's 
Likud and Shimon Peres's Labor, and to one of the worst political 
crises experienced in Israel.3 
In May 1990 the projected image of the Palestinian struggle 
reached unprecedented heights. The dramatic changes taking 
place in Eastern Europe, the advancing towards unity in the West 
and the dissolving of regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia 
and South West Africa, pointed to the urgency in solving the 
Palestinian issue in obtaining world peace. The reluctace of 
Yitzak Shamir's right wing government to accept the Baker Plan 
damaged Israel's international position and it seemed as if the 
Palestinians were closer than ever before to the attainment of a 
substantial political achievement. 
However, in August 1990, just a few months after this 
Palestinian climax the PLO found itself in one of it lowest ebbs. 
The dramatic regression in the effectiveness of the organization 
was a direct result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 
1990 that shifted the international attention away from the Pales-
tinian issue towards the Persian Gulf. The Palestinian position 
was further aggravated because of the support given by Arafat and 
the Palestinian masses to Saddam Hussein. 
III 
The Palestinian support of Iraq emerged sharply in the 
face of the international Anti-Iraqi coalition and especially in light 
of George Bush's partial success in undermining the mythology 
of Arab Unity in the face of foreign "imperialistic" intervention. 
On 10 August 1990, the Arab League adopted a seven point 
resolution rejecting the annexation of Kuwait, endorsing the U .N. 
sanctions against Iraq and calling for Arab troops to defend Saudi 
Arabia alongside the Americans. The Palestinians and the Liby-
ans remained the exceptions in their rejection. 
The Palestinian support of Saddam expressed their aver-
sion to U.S.-Arab ties indirectly advantageous to Israel. Support 
of Arab leaders of a Western embargo on Iraq was regarded by the 
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Palestinians as a form of disloyalty to their cause. In an interview 
to the New York Times a West Bank resident commented: "What 
these other Arab leaders are doing is selling cheap oil to America 
so the Americans can improve their economy and use it to support 
our enemy Israel. "4 In an editorial in the East Jerusalem newspaper 
al-Byadir al-SiYasi the writer said: "The jungle law allows U.S. 
to invade Grenada, to send forces to Panama and Liberia and to 
permit the invasion of Palestinian and Lebanese lands on the one 
hand, yet on the other declares a state of emergency and sends in 
forces against Iraq who entered Kuwait in order to recapture land 
that belonged to her historically." 5 
In addition to the outrage towards theArab-U.S. coalition, 
the Palestinian adherence to Saddam expressed feelings of ani-
mosity sensed by many members of their community towards the 
rulers of Gulf countries whose eminent wealth was overtly pro-
nounced in comparison to the poverty and distress of the Palestin-
ian refugees in the occupied territories. Many Palestinians re-
sented the boundless wealth of the Black Gold countries that have 
misused them as cheap manpower while denying them basic 
citizenry rights, refraining even from granting the Palestinians 
permanent residence status. 
Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait, one of the wealthiest 
Gulf countries, housed about 400,000 Palestinians who served its 
bureaucratic system in all its aspects. The Palestinians sent large 
sums of money to their families in the occupied territories so that 
each year about 130 million dollars, diverted through banks in 
Amman, was invested in the West Bank in private consumption as 
well as in local institutions. In addition, a 5% tax fee was levied 
on salaries earned by the Palestinians in Kuwait and other coun-
tries in the Gulf. This amounted to about 125 million dollars that 
went through the PLO to the Palestine National Fund. 6 
In July 1988 after King Hussein of Jordan severed ties 
with the West Bank, the Kuwaiti government used this opportu-
nity to put an end to the direct flow of funds to the PLO. The 
Kuwaitis also failed to comply with the decision taken by the Arab 
Summit held in Algiers in July 1988, that called on all Arab 
countries to aid the PLO. This refusal was condemned by Arafat 
in May 1989 in Casablanca. From the Palestinian reaction in the 
occupied territories it can be assumed that, although they benefit-
ted from the financial aid they had received over a number of 
years, the Palestinians harbor deep animosity toward the Gulf 
countries, and toward Kuwait in particular. Hi sham Hawartani, an 
economist from the WestBankUniversityof Al-Najah, inNablus, 
commented in an interview that, "in the last few years the 
Kuwaitis have become snobs, brags and slowly but surely severed 
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their ties with the Arab World. The influx of financial wealth into 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip was only of marginal importance 
and this is an impudence that they will not be forgiven for. The 
Kuwaitis have wealth beyond measure and they invested large 
sums everywhere else in the world except for here". 7 
Finally the Palestinians' rallying behind Saddam was an 
indication of their latent desire for Arab unity. As a stateless 
people, the Palestinians have come to represent a radical approach 
to Arab politics that combines anti establishment streams like 
Pan-Arabism, Third World and left ideologies and fundamental 
Islam, which all pose a direct challenge to the Arab state system. 
Hence they sought to exploit Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as a 
springboard to undermine the existing order. Furthermore, the 
Palestinians who are known for their historical tendency for 
divisions and schism in their ranks saw in the figure of Saddam 
Hussein a knight in shining armor who would unite the Arab world 
around their cause. Saddam's earlier threats against Israel and his 
conditioning an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait upon an Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories, strengthened the Pales-
tinians' long standing support for the Iraqi leader who has earned 
the title of the "Second Saladin." 
The conception that Arab unity will lead to the "liberation 
of Palestine" has been a central aspect in the ideological struggle 
of the Palestinians, though in reality all attempts to realize the 
dream of Pan-Arabism have resulted in disappointment. Since the 
declaration oflsraeli independence in 1948 (known by the Pales-
tinians as the "1948 disaster") and up to the defeat of Arab 
countries in the 1967 Six Day War, Palestinian nationality and 
Pan-Arabism were tightly linked. The main source of energy that 
inspired the creation of the Palestinian national movement was 
found in the charismatic personality of Gamal Abdul-Nasir who 
subscribed to the idea of a unitary Arab state, including liberated 
Palestine. Egypt, under the leadership of Nasir, became the 
leading patron of Palestinian nationalism. Nasirism struck roots in 
Palestinian mythology and served as a catalyst for the establish-
ment of the PLO in 1964. The integral attachment to Nasir's Pan-
Arabism was manifested in the PLO's early Charter where no 
mention is made of the Palestinians' desire for an independent 
state or govemment. 8 But the defeat suffered by the Arabs in 1967 
gradually led to Palestinian disillusionment with Pan-Arabism. 
As Fouad Ajami pointed out, "If the Arab States could not protect 
themselves against Israel, let alone do something for the Palestini-
ans then the latter were to construct their own independent 
politics.''9 
Moreover, the l 970's were marked by a sharp decline in 
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the pursuit of Arab unity among the Arab states' leaders, including 
the more revolutionary Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq, who 
have invested their efforts on widening their power base at home 
and consolidating their rule. Saddam Hussein, for example, has 
used much of Iraq's oil revenues to bridge the gap between rich 
and poor Iraqis and to accommodate Shiite demands. Since 1967, 
therefore, the Palestinians gradually set aside their adherence to 
Pan-Arabism and adopted an independent national stance. Their 
experience under Israeli occupation has helped to recreate them as 
a separate nation. 
The Palestinian armed struggle intensified during the 
1970' s and was marked by numerous terrorist acts inside Israel 
and abroad and by continuous attempts to establish a Palestinian 
military force along the Israeli borders, first in Jordan and later in 
Lebanon. The armed struggle strategy yielded diplomatic results 
and in 197 4, in Rabat, the Arab States recognized the PLO as the 
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This recogni-
tion was followed by major diplomatic coups for the PLO in many 
countries, especially in the Third World, and the PLO was 
elevated to a unique position in the United Nations. 10 Anwar el-
Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Egyptian-Israeli 
peace talks culminating in the Camp David Accords in 1979, 
further deepened the Palestinian mistrust of a Pan-Arabic salva-
tion. However, throughout all these years Palestinian diplomacy 
never gave up on the rhetoric of Arab unity .11 
IV 
The constant pursuit of the Palestinian problem was, and 
continues to be an important part of the legitimation formula of 
Arab governments. Both radical and conservative states invested 
economic resources and provided diplomatic support to the Pal-
estinian struggle and to the PLO for reasons far beyond their 
aversion to Israel or their authentic solidarity with the misfortune 
and distressful situation of their Arab brothers. This support of the 
Palestinians is intrinsically connected to the internal legitimation 
crisis of Arab regimes and it serves as an alibi for their failures to 
solve their internal problems. Paradoxically, however, the Arab's 
states failure to transform the Palestinian predicament has re-
mained one of the most important delegitimizing factors of their 
regimes. 12 
The central problem for progressive revolutionary states 
is one of identity-the lack of national-ethnic religious unity 
within the state and the existence of primordial loyalties that 
undermine the governmental legitimacy. Moreover in the absence 
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of democratic procedures force and suppression become central 
means of enlisting loyalty. As Lisa Anderson has pointed out: "the 
extent to which governments of the region rest their rule on naked 
power or clothe it in respect for regular procedures varies along a 
continuum from those whose fidelity to the rule oflaw is relatively 
constant to those whose behavior is widely condemned as essen-
tially criminal." 13 
The lack of democratic mechanisms in neutralizing oppo-
sition led many Arab states to search for ideological justification 
beyond their frontiers. Pan-Arabism, leftist ideologies of the 
Third World, as well as Islamic symbols serve as justifications for 
the progressive revolutionary states. Pro-Palestinian gestures 
became an important aspect of this multifaceted legitimation 
formula. The Syrian Baathist leadership in the hands of the Ala wi 
minority, for example, continuously proclaim their support of the 
Palestinians as one of their government's raison d'etre. In an oral 
address President Hafiz al-Assad expressed Syria's enduring 
support for the Palestinians: 
"How much have we sacrificed for the Resistance 
in the past few years? Fifty percent of the Syrian 
military aircraft destroyed in the clashes with the 
enemy [Israel] before the 1973 war were in the 
defence of positions of the Palestinian Resistance. 
Thirteen planes were lost in Urqub in defence of -
the Resistance. These aircrafts were manned by 
the elite of our pilots ... We lost 500 soldiers in one 
day. We lost them in a fight with the enemy 
because the enemy had hit a Fidai (guerilla) base 
somewhere in Syria. The battles we fought 
against the enemy for the sake of the Palestinian 
Resistance are numerous ... Who has done for the 
Resistance what Syria has done? Who has sacri-
ficed for the Resistance what Syria has sacri-
ficed?"14 
The Syrian rhetoric of fidelity to the Palestinian cause did not, 
however, deter Syrian soldiers from siding with the Christian 
Militia in Lebanon in 1976 against the Palestinians. Likewise, the 
Iraqi financial and diplomatic support of the Palestinians has 
always been tempered by Iraqi political needs.15 
As to the traditional Islamic regimes, their legitimation 
problem is rooted in their failure to comply with modem mythol-
ogy of popular sovereignty. This fact was exploited by revolution-
ary Arab regimes, in the past headed by Nasir and during the Gulf 
crisis by Saddam Hussein, who have challenged their mere 
existence. The fact that many of the Arab monarchies represent 
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merely family wealth derived from the oil fields with little other 
bases of legitimacy stands in sharp contrast to the Palestinians 
who have a nation and a people, widely recognized by the 
international community, yet remain stateless. This contradiction 
between a stateless people and a nationless monarchy has proved 
continuously destabilizing. Hence, Arab monarchies have tried to 
diffuse revolutionary pressures to transform their systems by 
paying homage to Pan-Arabism, primarily to its most common 
denominator - the Palestinians - who have come to represent a 
binding force in an increasingly vague notion of Arab unity. It is 
for this reason Arab monarchies provided strong diplomatic 
support and lavish financial aid to the PLO and were reluctant to 
support Egypt's conciliatory moves towards Israel in Camp 
David. 
But beyond their rhetorical adherence to Pan-Arabism, 
Arab regimes and leaders must constantly demonstrate their 
devotion to Islam. As the historian Bernard Lewis commented: 
"Islam provides the most effective system of political mobiliza-
tion, whether to arouse the people in defence of a regime that is 
perceived as possessing the necessary legitimacy or against a 
regime which is perceived as lacking that legitimacy, in other 
words, not being Islamic or, perhaps, as having forfeited that 
legitimacy by no longer being Islamic." 16 Arab leaders therefore, 
including those at the head of modern secular states such as Syria 
and Iraq, must incorporate Islamic rhetoric and symbols as part of 
their ruling mechanism in their campaign to destroy religious 
opponents who challenge their claims to power. Saddam Hussein's 
court biographers even found it appropriate to mythologize their 
leader by tracing his origins back to the prophet Mohammed. 
Adherence to Islam as a basis for internal legitimation 
intensified with the decline of Nasirism following the 1967 defeat, 
and as a result of the erosion in the concept of Arab unity with the 
consolidation of Arab revolutionary regimes. Ironically, it was 
Saddam Hussein who announced in 1982, that "the question of 
linking [Arab] unity to the removal of boundaries is no longer 
acceptable to present Arab mentality." 17 He declared Nasir's 
vision of an Arab nation as one state as "sheer dreams" and called 
for all Arab states' to exercise mutual respect to the demarcation 
of boundaries between them. 18 
The need to pay homage to Islam increased significantly 
after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which provoked fundamental 
currents in the entire Arab-Moslem world. Dependency on Islam 
enhances the stature of the Palestinians in the Arab world as they 
have come to represent, (and indeed promote their image as) the 
sacrificial lamb in the struggle to recapture the Holy City in East 
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Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel after the 1967 War. Since 
1967, therefore, the fight for Jerusalem became a major force in 
the hands of the Palestinians in rallying Arab and Islamic support. 
The Temple Mount in East Jerusalem has been a source of 
tension and national religious struggle between Arabs and Jews 
for many generations. The Temple Mount, known as al-Haram al 
Sharif, is second only to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia as a 
holy shrine for the Muslims. Also found on the Temple Mount are 
the only ruins of the Second Temple sanctified by the Jews as their 
holiest site. In 1929, a bloody riot broke out between Arabs and 
Jews in Palestine following a dispute over Jewish prayer at the 
Wailing Wall. The Jews tried to implement freedom of worship 
while the Muslims believed them to have ulterior motives aimed 
at conquering the Temple Mount and rebuilding the Jewish 
Temple. From 1948 to 1967 the Temple Mount and East Jerusa-
lem were under Jordanian occupation. Despite earlier Jordanian 
proclamations to allow freedom of worship, the Jews were denied 
access to the Wailing Wall. In the aftermath of the Six Day War, 
Israel and Jordan, with tacit approval of local Palestinians, infor-
mally agreed to the control of the Temple Mount by the Islamic 
Endowments (A wkaf) which was part of the Jordanian official 
bureaucracy. Since July 1988, when Jordan severed its ties with 
the West Bank, more and more Islamic radicals have penetrated 
the Awkaf. 
The arrangement at the Temple Mount did not prevent the 
conversion of the place to a fertile ground for inciting religious 
and political riots. In August 1969, a 21 year old Christian, 
Michael Rowen, set alight the al-Aksa Mosque. Subsequently it 
was discovered that Rowen was psychologically unstable; yet the 
reaction of the Arab countries was extreme and in the U.N. they 
proposed to send an investigation committee to look into the 
matter. At the outbreak of the intifada the Palestinian leadership 
declared the day of Rowen's failed attempt a memorial day to be 
honored by demonstrations and strikes. On 11 April 1982, Alan 
Goodman, a Jewish-American who lived in Jerusalem and served 
in the Israeli army, burst into the al-Aksa Mosque opening fire and 
killing two Arabs. It was assessed that he too was deranged. For 
whatever reason the event was subsequently erased from Palestin-
ian memory as indicated by the failure of the intifada leaders to 
sanctify it as a memorial day. 
Over the years a number of attempts by Jewish extremists 
and various criminal groups to break into and rampage mosques 
on the Temple Mount were uncovered. The most militant and 
vocal Jewish extremist is a minority group called the "Temple 
Mount Faithfuls" who have advocated to "cleanse" the holy site 
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of all Muslim mosques in order to rebuild what they called the 
"Third Jewish Temple." Defying a religious prohibition declared 
by the Chief Rabbinical court forbidding observant Jews from 
entering the Temple Mount area, the Temple Mount Faithfuls 
have constantly attempted to hold prayers and symbolic demon-
strations on the Mount. Their activities have constantly led to 
outbursts of violence and the provocation of the Muslim-Arabs 
populace. Muslim leaders have declared every such event to be an 
Israeli government's plot to takeover the holy mosques. 
On the Palestinian side, during the 1980's, and in particu-
larly during the intifada there has been a rapid growth of radical 
Moslem groups exploiting the Temple Mount mosques as a stage 
for Islamic propaganda, anti-Jewish incitements, and as a safe 
haven during clashes with Israeli police. 19 Since the mid 1980's 
Islamic activism has been intensified among the Palestinians who 
have gradually lost confidence in the PLO's diplomatic strategy. 
For Palestinians who are experiencing political, social and eco-
nomic deprivation under Israeli occupation, Islam fills an ideo-
logical and political vacuum; its eschatological promises provide 
symbolic gratification and compensate for their daily sacrifices. 
The central Islamic movement in the occupied territories is 
Hamas, an umbrella organization consisting of members of the 
Muslim Brothers Movement in the Gaza Strip and theal-Muiamma 
'al-Jslami. In addition to Hamas, which is a mass movement 
whose ideology bridges Islam and Palestinian nationalism, the 
other significant organization with strong followers is the Islamic 
li.hfilJ.. The latter which is more militant in its objectives, sees the 
Islamic Republic of Iran as its model and conducts a selective 
recruiting policy .20 
Prior to the violent incident on the Temple Mount on 
8 October 1990, rumors had been spreading amongst the Pales-
tinians that the Temple Mount Faithfuls were planning to lay a 
cornerstone for the intended construction of the Third Temple. 
The Israeli Supreme Court, aware of the tension, had granted a 
restraining order explicitly forbidding the Temple Mount Faith-
fuls from making their yearly pilgrimage to the holy site. The 
Israeli police conveyed this information to Muslim community 
leaders. Unsatisfactory precautionary measures taken to reduce 
the tension, resulted in the unprecedented bloodshed on the 
Temple Mount and caused international outrage towards Israel, 
including unanimous condemnation in the U.N. Security Council 
and a motion to send a three member investigatory mission to 
probe the events in Jerusalem. The Israeli government's stance 
was further aggravated when it rejected the decision as an in-
fringement on Israel's sovereignty. 
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For many the Palestinian support of Saddam appeared as 
a fatal mistake which would eventually take its toll. Many experts 
suggested that "the spectacle of Arafat's embrace of Saddam 
Hussein will undoubtedly give pause to the PLO's most hardened 
enthusiasts in Europe and the United States," 21 and that the only 
beneficiary of the Palestinian stand will be Israel, whose refusal 
to enter into negotiations with the PLO, will be readily accepted 
and sympathized with by the international community. Joel Brin-
kley wrote in the New York Times that by supporting Saddam "the 
momentum that the Palestinians built up through nearly three 
years of uprising in the Israel -co11trolled West Bank and Gaza 
Strip appears to have been lost." 22 Lilly Weissebrod, a political 
sociologist specializing in Middle East ideologies argued that, the 
Palestinian "support of Saddam will avail them nothing even in 
the unlikely event that he emerges victorious from the conflict 
with the U.S." 23 But the chain of events in the occupied territories 
during summer of 1990 which culminated in the outburst of 
violence in Old Jerusalem on 8 October leaving about eighteen 
Arabs dead, refuted the prediction that the Palestinians had been 
losing footing on the international scene. Following the fatal 
clashes on the Temple Mount the Palestinian issue rebounded to 
the forefront of world affairs encompassing enough power to pose 
a threat even to the international unity against Iraq. 
At present one should not discount the damage in the 
international sphere caused by Arafat's embrace of Saddam, 
nor should one underestimate the decline of PLO's stature in 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries that have 
come to view the organization as a "fifth column." Yet, despite 
the present aversion to the PLO, in the long run Arab states can 
not abandon the Palestinians or its leadership. The Palestinian 
have come to penetrate Arab consciousness and any attempt to 
ignore their plight may haunt Arab regimes. 
Indeed, the Gulf crisis exposed the political bankruptcy 
of Pan-Arabism, as Arab soldiers took opposing sides in the 
midst of an international crisis. It proved that Arab states were 
striving primarily to enhance their own political objectives 
divorced from their Arab connection. Saudi Arabia rushed to 
invite American forces to protect its sovereignty despite its 
vulnerability to charges of hosting "sacrilegious infidels" at the 
holy sites. Egypt's reward for its allegiance to President Bush 
was a quick waiver of its national debts of about seven billion 
dollars. Hafiz-al-Assad of Syria saw in the Gulf crisis a unique 
opportunity to avenge his historic Baathist enemies in Baghdad. 
In allying himself with Washington, Assad was also able to put 
an end to his growing isolation resulting from the Soviets' new 
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disengagement policy from regional conflicts. Finally , the 
aligning of Syrian forces alongside the Americans gave Assad 
a free hand in eliminating his rivals in Lebanon. 
The Palestinians, however, who have no state power at their 
disposal, remained isolated in their attempts to manipulate Pan-
Arab feelings against U.S. and foreign intervention. They have 
sought to use the Iraqi invasion to their advantage by advocating 
Arab unity under the banner of "Arab solution to an Arab prob-
lem," thereby linking any diplomatic resolution in Kuwait with a 
resolution in Palestine. But Arafat's call for Arab unity remained 
unheeded in Cairo, Damascus and Riyad. 
In the face of the impotence of Pan-Arabism, Islam remains 
a powerful resonant alternative through which Palestinians can 
appeal to the Arab world. Through their presence in Jerusalem and 
the Temple Mount Palestinians have drawn Arab states back into 
their fold, forcing them to remain active in their struggle . To the 
Arab states' consternation, the Palestinians have demonstrated 
that any attempt to attain state goals or to solve inter-state relations 
in the region cannot bypass the Palestinian cause. The Temple 
Mount incident reemphasized the strong hold Palestinian exert 
over Islam and served as a reminder that no Arab leader can 
dispense with Palestinians in pursuing domestic or international 
objectives. 
At the time of writing {November 1990) a resolution to the 
Gulf crisis is not yet in sight. However, it is already clear that the 
Palestinians have succeeded in injecting themselves into the 
international scene as central players in a variety of manners: 
1) in the international scene, the recognition of Palestinian rights 
for self-determination has long been an integral part of the U.N. 
agenda, and there is a growing inclination among Western world 
leaders to link a solution in the Gulf with the issue of Palestine -
whether through a diplomatic initiative or following an Iraqi 
defeat in a military operation; 2) in the overall Muslim world 
Palestinians are a major force in generating anti-West solidarity; 
3) within the Arab states Palestinians are capable of undermining 
regimes' attempts to relax strong Islamic opposition and serve as 
key players in the Arab states' ability to sustain national cohesive-
ness - as most acutely demonstrated in Jordan where 60 percent 
of the population, who are of Palestinian origin, have sided with 
Arafat in supporting Saddam and thus forced King Hussein to 
walk a tight rope by adopting a "Palestinian" foreign policy. 
Thus, unlike many other ethnic groups, and especially exile 
organizations searching for state power, the Palestinian have 
emerged as a dynamic force in world affairs and not merely as 
playing cards in the hands of others. 
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